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1. Introduction 
Numerous studies have examined the impact of voluntary and mandatory disclosure on firm 
reputation. Armitage and Marston (2008) reveal that the major motivations for firm disclosure 
of risk are enhancing the company’s reputation for openness, as well as maintaining 
confidence in the company among shareholders and others. Beyer and Dye (2012) find that 
managers can build a strong reputation by disclosing even the most negative forecasts. Zeng 
et al. (2012) notice that firms with better reputations are more likely to disclose environmental 
information. While the prior literature suggests a connection between disclosure and company 
reputation, there is no study concerning the impact of risk disclosure on reputation. In 
addition, several of these papers have used pooled data and, in effect, ignore the impact of 
individual firms. Our study attempts to contribute to the existing literature in several ways. 
First, our objective is to examine whether more risk reporting through annual reports can 
improve company image and promote reputation. Second, we use a panel data methodology to 
control for heterogeneity among individual firms and compare the results of alternative 
empirical models. Furthermore, we aim in this study to contribute to legitimacy theory.  
Despite the high risk of negative reactions from investors over less-than-excellent news, 
several firms are choosing to disclose more information about their operations, even the most 
negative. This high level of transparency may make companies more desirable among 
investors, and thereby contributes to improving firm reputation. Additionally, prior studies 
assume a positive link between transparency and reputation (Mazzola et al., 2006; 
Ussahawanitchakit, 2011; and Kongpunya et al., 2011). The purpose of this paper is to 
respond to two substantial questions. The first of these concerns the expected reaction of 
investors to risk communication. On the one hand, they may consider this information as risky 
and thus choose not to invest in the company, which they may deem undesirable. On the other 
hand, investors may consider this “negative” information to be a sign of transparency, which 
will incite them to invest in the company. The second question concerns the impact of 
company risk level on investor notions. Furthermore, we attempt to detect whether risk 
reporting for firms with very high-risk exposure has the same impact on reputation.  
We use the “France’s Most Admired Companies” list published in Fortune Magazine in order 
to measure company reputation. We measure risk disclosure by using “six risk word” lists 
(uncertain, weak model, negative, legal, opportunity and environment and social 
responsibility lists), by adopting Zreik and Louhichi’s methodology (2015). We find that risk 
disclosure promotes reputation. This result is robust for alternative empirical models (pooled 
OLS, fixed effects, and random effects) and for alternative measurements of reputation. We 
also test the impact of different types of risk communication (uncertain, weak model, 
negative, legal, opportunity and environment and social responsibility) on reputation. The 
results show that these different types of risk words impact reputation in different ways. 
Furthermore, we conduct an additional analysis to test whether risk exposure has any impact 
on the relationship between risk reporting and reputation. We observe that for very high-risk 
firms, risk reporting does not impact the firm's reputation. 
Our study reveals several interesting findings. First, we highlight the positive impact of 
communication about risk on the firm's reputation. Second, we find that pooled OLS over-
estimates this impact. Our results provide support for the legitimacy theory, as we show that 
revealing more information about risks and uncertainty over annual reports is compensated 
with a positive reputation. To our knowledge, this study is the first that attempts to examine 
the impact of risk reporting on reputation in the French market. Our findings have 
implications for both theory and practice. First, the impact of risk disclosure on reputation 
does not dissent from the impact of total firm disclosure. Second, the results of our study 
encourage firms to be more transparent, even about their potential risk, to enhance their 
reputation.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we present a brief literature review about the connection 
between reputation and firm disclosure. Second, we detail the data and research methodology.  
Our main findings are then presented, and we then verify the robustness of our results. Lastly, 
we summarize and conclude the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
The importance of building a good reputation has received significant attention. Several 
studies consider reputation to be a powerful factor in organizational viability (Scott and 
Walsham, 2005; and Vidaver-Cohen and Brønn, 2013). Since reputation is considered to be a 
measure of investor perceptions of company performance (Scott and Walsham, 2005; Petkova 
et al., 2014; Rindova and Fombrun, 1999; Keh and Xie, 2009), the previous literature has 
tried to determine whether social responsibility can have an impact on reputation. Brammer 
and Pavelin (2004) notice that there is a positive link between reputation, measured by using 
the “Britain’s Most Admired Companies” ranking, and social performance. In addition, they 
highlight that this connection is clearer for the biggest firms. As well as this, Maden et al. 
(2012) confirm that corporate social responsibility not only positively impacts reputation but 
also has a positive effect on investor, employee, and client behaviour. Moreover, Michelon 
(2011) shows that company reputation leads to improved sustainability disclosure by using an 
international sample (57 constituents of the Dow Jones sustainability index).  
Very few studies have focused solely on analyzing the impact of risk reporting through annual 
reports on firm reputation, such as Chong (2013), who conducts a survey of the Hong Kong 
exchange market to investigate the effects of risk disclosure on corporate reputation, corporate 
trust and media visibility. The author concludes that the perceived importance of corporate 
reputation is connected with forms of corporate attributes in risk disclosure.  
As mentioned above, the quantity and the quality of disclosure promote reputation regardless 
of whether this information is positive or negative. Our aim is to define whether 
communication about risk information has any impact on reputation. Moreover, we focus on 
the French market, since we observe a gap in the literature focusing on French firms.  
 
3. Research Method 
3.1. Sample design and data collection 
The sample selection process begins with all firms listed in Euronext Paris and included the 
SBF120 Index between 2006 and 2011. After excluding 17 financial firms and checking and 
screening for apparent coding errors and missing data, a balanced panel data of 408 annual 
reports of 68 firms remained for the estimation. The electronic annual reports were gathered 
from the firms’ websites or by sending an e-mail to firms when the reports could not be 
obtained from the website. As for reputation variables, we employ Fortune Magazine’s 
reputation scores for six years (2006-2011). Because our focus is the French market, we use 
the annual lists compiled and published by Fortune Magazine, ranking the top French firms. 
We consider all firms on the Most Admired list and the Contenders list as high-reputation 
firms. The difference between these two lists (Most Admired and Contenders) is that to 
appear as Most Admired, a company must have scored in the top half of its industry survey. 
The rest are listed as contenders. The final sample of reputation scores were 97 French firms 
listed on Fortune Magazine’s Most Admired list over 6 years.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
We use several control variables: firm age, market capitalization, research and development 
expenditure and market to book value. The market capitalization, book value, research and 
development expenditure, and firm age data were derived from DataStream. Table 1 
summarizes the descriptive statistics of our variables. We notice that reputation scores range 
from 3.4 to 7.26 with a small standard deviation of approximately 0.81 and a mean of about 6. 
The risk disclosure variable goes from 0 to 21728 risk words; this interprets the high standard 
deviation (3166). Firm age, logarithm of market capitalization, research and development 
expenditure and market to book ratio are ranked between 1 and 347, 5 and 12, 0 and 3152000 
and -2 and 34 respectively with 69, 1.32, 483337 and 2.13 standard deviation respectively. 
 
3.2. Variables: measurement and description 
To measure risk disclosure (our independent variable), we follow Zreik and Louhichi (2015). 
Therefore, we consider “six risk words” lists (Uncertain, Opportunity, Negative, Weak form, 
Legal and Government Regulations and Environmental and Social Responsibility words). We 
thus find 306 uncertain words, 25 opportunity words, 2184 negative words, 32 weak words, 
889 legal and government regulations words, and 67 environmental and social responsibility 
words. We measure total risk disclosure by calculating the total frequency of these risk words 
in the annual reports. 
For the dependent variable (firm reputation), we use two proxies. The first is the reputation 
scores obtained from Fortune Magazine’s reputation scores, published with its list of 
“France’s Most Admired Companies” (Philippe and Durand, 2011, Pfarrer et al., 2010 and 
Basideo et al., 2006) and its list of “France’s Contenders” companies. The second one is a 
dummy variable which distinguishes between those firms with a score in Fortune Magazine’s 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our variables. The reputation scores are Fortune Magazine’s reputation scores, 
published in its list of its “France’s Most Admired Companies”, the dummy variable of reputation is a dummy variable with a 
value of 1 for those firms with a score on Fortune Magazine’s reputation scores and 0 otherwise. Risk disclosure is measured 
by counting the frequency of “six risk words” lists. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s founding. Firm value is 
measured by the natural logarithm of annual firm market capitalization. Research and development expenditure is the annual 
expenditure for research and development. Market to book ratio is market capitalization divided by book value of equity. 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Reputation scores 5.965567 .8096758 3.4 7.26 
Dummy variable of reputation .2279412 .4200195 0 1 
Risk disclosure 3362.1 3165.527 0 21728 
Firm age 78.46324 69.39085 1 347 
Firm value 8.439835 1.320575 5.317195 11.7849 
Research and development expenditures 298365.8 483337 0 3152000 
Market to book ratio 2.255812 2.129365 -1.62 34.25 
reputation scores, published with its list of “France’s Most Admired Companies” and those 
without a score (Delgado-García et al., 2013).  We use the second proxy in order to test the 
robustness of our findings. 
The previous literature proposes several variables to use as controls for the reputation model. 
Ussahawanitchakit et al. (2011) use firm experience, measured by the number of employees 
currently working for a firm; firm capital, which was measured by the amount of capital 
invested; and finally, firm reward, which was measured by the recognized awards a firm has 
won. Hasseldine et al. (2005) use the beta, return on equity, industry, size (sales turnover), 
research and development expenditure and corporate diversification. Philippe and Durand 
(2011) use industry dummies; in addition, they include year dummies to control for inter-year 
variability. They also use age as the logged number of years a firm has been operating, size 
measured as a yearly logged measure of total assets, and performance by using two-year 
average return on assets. Little et al. (2009) study how reputation explains variation in the 
market to book value, and they obtain significant results in finding that firms with high 
market to book ratio have a lower corporate reputation rate. We control our model for firm 
age measured by the logarithm of the number of years since creation, firm size measured by 
the natural logarithm of annual market capitalization, research and development expenditure 
measured by the natural logarithm of annual research and development expenditure, and 
market to book ratio measured by the annual average of daily market to book ratio. Prior 
studies suggest a positive impact of firm age, firm size, market to book, and research and 
development expenditures on the firm’s reputation (Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Little et al., 
2009; and Hasseldine et al., 2005). 
 
3.3. Estimation Technique 
To investigate the relationship between company reputation and risk disclosure, we estimate 
the following models: 
Basic model: 
 	
              (1) 
 
Robustness test model: 
 	
              (2) 
 
Where Scores is Fortune Magazine’s reputation scores, published with its list of “France’s 
Most Admired Companies”, RepD is the reputation dummy variable with a value of 1 for 
those firms with a score on Fortune magazine’s reputation scores, and 0 otherwise, RD is the 
total number of risk words, Lage is the log of number of years since creation, Lmc is the 
annual market capitalization log, LReDe is the annual research and development expenditure 
log, and mtb is the annual average of daily market to book ratio.  
As stated before, our data are organized in panel data. Panel data control for individual 
heterogeneity by suggesting that individuals are both heterogeneous and homogeneous. 
Moreover, this gives more informative data, more variability, less collinearity, and a greater 
degree of freedom (Hsiao, 2003 and Klevmarken, 1989). In order to empirically test whether 
an association exists between risk disclosure and the firm’s reputation scores, we use three 
models (pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects) for the reputation score model 
(equation 1). In addition, we use pooled logistic, random-effects and fixed effects logistic 
models for the reputation dummy variable (equation 2). In using the fixed effects model, we 
assume that the individual may impact or bias the predictors. The fixed effects model removes 
this effect and tabulates the net effect of the predictors on the outcome variable (Wooldridge, 
2002 and Christopher, 2006). Another important assumption of the fixed effects model is that 
this impact of the individual is unique and should not be correlated with other individual 
characteristics. Each entity is different, therefore the entity’s error term and the constant 
(which captures individual characteristics) should not be correlated with the others. If the 
error terms are correlated, then the fixed effects model is not suitable. The random effects 
model supposes that the individual effects are held by the intercept and a random component. 
This random component is not correlated with the predictor.  To choose between fixed and 
random effects, we use the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). The null hypothesis is that the 
random effect is preferred because the errors are not correlated with the regressors. Moreover, 
we calculate the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) that helps to 
choose between a random effects regression and a pooled OLS regression. The null 
hypothesis in the LM test is that variances across entities are zero. Furthermore, we provide 
several statistical tests to examine the validity of our results, such as the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation for panel data, and the variance inflation factor (VIF) to test autocorrelation 
for the pooled OLS model. 
   
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
In this section we display the results from the different tests in several stages. First, we detail 
the results regarding total risk reporting. We then present the results regarding “risk word” 
lists. After that, we present the robustness test. Lastly, we carry out a raft of additional 
analyses to recognize the impact of the level of a firm’s risk on this relation (the association 
between risk disclosure and company reputation). 
 
4.1. Findings regarding total risk reporting 
Table 2 reports the regression results for equation 1 using three different methodologies: 
pooled OLS, the fixed effects model, and the random effects model. The results show that risk 
reporting has a positive impact on company reputation at the 1% significance level for the 
pooled OLS and random effects model.  The fixed effects model presents no significant 
association between risk disclosure and company reputation, but the F-test of the model was 
not significant (about 0.26, not tabulated). Regarding these findings, we conclude that the 
positive impact of risk reporting on reputation is robustness.  
The point estimates range from 0.009% to 0.011%, suggesting that a firm’s reputation level 
increases by about 0.009% to 0.011% when risk disclosure increases by 1%. The impact of 
control variables on reputation has unexpected signs, except company size: firm age measured 
by the logarithm of the number of years since founding has a negative impact on reputation 
and the logarithm of research and development expenditure is also negative and significant at 
the 1 % level. Book to market ratio has a negative and significant association with reputation 
at 10% for random effects. Firm size measured by the logarithm of market capitalization 
impacts positively and significantly on company reputation at the            1% level. To identify 
which empirical methodology (pooled OLS, fixed effects, or random effects) is most suitable, 
we carry out two statistical tests: first, the Lagrange multiplier test for random effects. The 
null hypothesis is that the variances across individuals are zero. The acceptance of the null 
hypothesis suggests that the random effects model is not preferred.  
The results show that we cannot accept the null hypothesis. This means that the random 
effects model is more suitable than pooled regression. If we compare the two coefficients of 
both models we notice that the coefficient from the pooling regression equals approximately 
1.2 times the coefficient of random effects regression. Thus, pooled OLS over-estimates the 
impact of risk reporting on reputation. Second, we perform the Hausman specification test 
(Hausman, 1978) to identify which model is more suitable (random or fixed effects). Under 
the Hausman test the null hypothesis suggests that the random effect model is preferred 
because the errors are not correlated with the regressors. Looking at table 2, the null 
hypothesis is accepted and the random model is more suitable. We next address serial 
autocorrelation issues that might impact the estimation results. We perform a Wooldridge test 
that supposes no serial autocorrelation among variables as the null hypothesis. The results 
show an absence of autocorrelation. 
 
As shown above, investors prefer firms that address their potential risk and their uncertainty 
more openly to firms that hide this kind of information. Managers should disclose even the 
risks and uncertainty companies are facing to build a good reputation, especially in view of 
the fact that firms with good reputations experience greater market rewards for positive 
surprises and smaller market penalties for negative surprises (Pfarrer et al., 2010). On the one 
hand, disclosing this negative information may cause stock price to fall short-term; but, at the 
same time, being clear and unambiguous can prevent damage to reputation in the long-run 
(Fuller and Jensen, 2002). On the other hand, opacity and vagueness in firm reporting hinders 
shareholder ability to discriminate good from bad projects at an early stage (Bleck and Liu, 
2007); and consequently impacts reputation negatively. Our results are consistent with 
previous research. Beyer and Dye (2012) find that managers can build a strong reputation by 
disclosing even the most negative forecasts. Likewise, legitimacy theory is based on the idea 
that companies signal their legitimacy by disclosing clear and obvious information in their 
annual report (Watson et al., 2002). Furthermore, Shocker and Sethi (1973) show that every 
Table 2 
The impact of total risk reporting on reputation scores 
 	
             
Table 2 presents the results of pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects model of the equation (1): 
Scores is the Fortune magazine’s reputation scores, published with its list of “France’s Most Admired Companies”, RD is the 
total number of “risk words”, Lage is the log of the number of years since creation, Lmc is the log of annual market 
capitalization, LReDe is the annual research and development expenditure log, and mtb is the annual average of daily market to 
book ratio. The Lagrange multiplier test is used to test the random effects model versus pooling regression. The Hausman 
specification test is used to test the fixed effects model versus the random effects model. The variance inflation factor is 
tabulated to test the autocorrelation for pooling regression. The Wooldridge test is used to test the serial autocorrelation for 
panel data. 
* Significant at the 10 % level 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
Variable Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects 
Scores Coef P. Value Vif Coef P.value Coef P.Value 
RD .00011*** 0.000 1.25 -.00003 0.631 .00009*** 0.011 
Lage -.33232*** 0.003 1.95 -1.08430 0.219 -.34345*** 0.008 
Lmc .42066*** 0.000 2.01 .36248 0.255 .38992*** 0.001 
LReDe -.27125*** 0.012 1.06 -.02359 0.344 -.24955** 0.051 
mtb -.02229 0.233 1.12 .33707 0.286 -.02798* 0.106 
Constant 6.087666*** 0.000  2.70076 0.640 6.29953*** 0.001 
R-square
 
0.37 0.01 0.42 
Mean VIF 1.48 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 0.2357 
Lagrange multiplier test for random effects 0.0227 Hausman fixed random effects test 0.6807 
firm has a social contract with society. The firm continues if it delivers socially desirable ends 
to society, and economic, social, or political benefits to the groups from which it derives its 
power. Hence, to disclose information about firm risks is a part of this social contract and it 
should be rewarded. Therefore, a good reputation is a kind of remuneration for the firm’s 
legitimacy. Consequently, our results contribute to the literature on legitimacy theory, and 
indicate that disclosing more information about risks and uncertainties enhances the levels of 
public recognition of the firm’s capabilities and output quality, as well as making the firm 
more distinctive within their parallel group. In a nutshell, investors prefer firms that publish 
all their information, be it positive or negative,   to other firms that are less transparent.   
Regarding control variables, the literature assumes that older and larger firms are more 
interesting to build a good reputation (Deephouse, 1996 and Deephouse and Carter, 2005). 
The empirical results of previous studies were not able to prove this theory. Philippe and 
Durand (2008) notice no significant association between firm age and reputation. On the 
contrary, Flatt and Kowalczyk (2011) find, as is the case in our results, a negative association 
between firm age and reputation. Hannan and Freeman (1984) point out that increasing trust 
takes time and older firms are more favored due to repeated interactions with other 
organizations and environments. In addition, we educe that bigger firms are more reputable 
than smaller ones, whereas Flatt and Kowalczyk (2011) find a negative relationship between 
these two variables. With regard to the research and development expenditure variable, we 
detect that expending more for research and development impacts reputation negatively. This 
result is not harmonious with our expectation and with Hasseldine et al. (2005), who find a 
positive link between research and development spending and reputation. In addition, our 
results show that book to market ratio does not promote reputation.  
 
4.2. Findings regarding “risk word” lists 
After verifying that the most suitable model is the random effects model1, we run the random 
effects regression for each word list separately (Uncertain, Opportunity, Negative, Weak 
form, Legal and Government Regulations and Environmental and Social Responsibility 
words).  
Table 3 indicates that “uncertain”, “opportunity”, “weak” and “environmental & social 
responsibility” word lists have a significant positive impact on reputation. Furthermore, the 
results indicate that “negative” and “legal & government regulations” word lists do not affect 
company reputation. This means that disclosing uncertain, opportunity and environmental and 
social responsibility information has a positive impact on how firms are perceived. Disclosing 
weak words and opportunity information impacts the firm’s reputation more than other lists. 
The coefficients of the weak form list and the opportunity list are about 0.001 and 0.002 
respectively. This means that firm’s reputation level increases by about 0.1% to 0.2% when 
weak form and opportunity words disclosure increases by 1%, while the coefficients of 
uncertain and environmental & social responsibility word lists are approximately 0.0006 and 
0.0002 respectively. The impact of the other variables is robust for several word lists. Firm 
size measured by market capitalization impacts company reputation positively for all word 
lists. In addition, the negative effect of firm age remains significant for all lists except the 
“weak form” list. 
The negative sign of the research and development expenditures remains for all lists except 
the opportunity and legal & government regulations lists. Market to book ratio significantly 
and positively impacts a firm’s reputation for three lists (uncertain, negative and 
environmental & social responsibility). Our created word lists have typically negative 
implications in a financial sense; however, the importance of these lists differs according to 
 

We obtained this result by performing Langrage and Hausman test; these tests are not tabulated. 
the context and investor priority. Few academic papers have examined disclosure according to 
investor priority, which makes interpreting our results difficult. Loughran and McDonald 
(2013) find that a higher frequency of uncertain, weak, and negative words is associated with 
higher volatility. This positive association reflects the importance of this information. 
Surprisingly, our results show that the negative word list does not affect reputation; however, 
the coefficient has positive sign. Previous studies have found a positive impact of 
environmental disclosure and social responsibility on reputation (Hasseldine et al., 2005; 
Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001). Fred Garcia and Ewing (2008) find that the firms that cede the 
litigation communication advantage to their adversaries may suffer significant reputational 
harm. According to this result, the number of lawsuits and legal issues that companies face 
may not impact reputation. Accordingly, investors consider companies that publish uncertain 
information (uncertain and weak form word lists) and future opportunities to be transparent. 
Moreover, environmental and social responsibility is an important concern for investors. 
Hence, disclosing this kind of information will improve company image and, consequently, 
reputation. 
Table 3 
The impact of “risk word” lists  on reputation scores 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the random effects model of equation (1) by using  the word lists  as an independent variable instead of total 
risk: 
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Scores is the Fortune magazine’s reputation scores, published with its list of “France’s Most Admired Companies”, Uncertain  is the 
uncertain word list, Opportunity is the opportunity word list, Negative is the negative word list, Weak is the weak form word list, L&G is the 
legal and government regulations word list, Env & SR is the environmental and social responsibility word list, Lage is the log of number of 
years since creation, Lmc is the log of annual market capitalization, mtb is the annual average of daily market to book ratio, LReDe is the log 
of annual research and development expenditures. 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
Scores Uncertain Opportunity Negative Weak L&G Env &SR 
RD .00059*** (0.002) 
.00107** 
(0.036) 
.00029 
(0.168) 
.00156*** 
(0.007) 
.00013 
(0.337) 
.00024* 
(0.056) 
Lage -.26634* (0.066) 
-.34650** 
(0.037) 
-.42794*** 
(0.015) 
-.21949 
(0.149) 
-.34337** 
(0.050) 
-.40530*** 
(0.014) 
Lmc .30774*** (0.009) 
.36084*** 
(0.010) 
.390457*** 
(0.009) 
.22753* 
(0.063) 
.31770** 
(0.027) 
.44775*** 
(0.004) 
LReDe -.27856** (0.032) 
-.10374 
(0.515) 
-.26314* 
(0.081) 
-.27600** 
(0.035) 
-.22262 
(0.150) 
-.26348* 
(0.078) 
mtb -.02901* (0.089) 
-.02151 
(0.206) 
-.02915* 
(0.081) 
-.02476 
(0.160) 
-.02463 
(0.160) 
-.03273* 
(0.069) 
Constant 7.01409*** (0.000) 
4.86326** 
(0.039) 
6.98112*** 
(0.001) 
7.64504*** 
(0.000) 
6.97066*** 
(0.001) 
6.46058*** 
(0.002) 
R-square 0.48 0.36 0.36 0.43 0.28 0.38 
 
 
5. Additional analysis 
We carry out a raft of additional analysis to ascertain whether risk reporting behavior differs 
according to the firm’s risk level. To highlight such differentiation, we discriminate between 
very risky firms and other firms.  Thus, all the firms in our sample are ordered by 
idiosyncratic risk level. We define very risky firms as those belonging to the highest decile of 
risk ordered idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, we took into account additional criteria to split 
the sample and we obtained similar results. These results are not reported here but are 
available upon request.  
Looking at table 4, we notice that the positive impact of risk reporting on company reputation 
no longer exists for very high-risk firms. In other words, this impact is significant only for 
low-risk firms. By comparing the results of table 2 with the results of table 4, we perceive that 
the results for entire sample suggest positive impact as same as the low-risk sample.  
 
In summary, our results suggest that risk reporting for risky firms does not impact firm 
reputation. Company reputation reflects potential future performance (Fombrun and Riel, 
1997; Delgado-García et al., 2013); it follows that firms at risk will not be preferable.  In 
other words, since most investors are risk-averse, company risk is a determining factor of the 
impact of risk reporting on reputation. In general, firms can improve their image and enhance 
their reputation by lowering financial risk (Hammond and Slocum, 1996; Delgado-García et 
al., 2013). Accordingly, risk reporting for low-risk firms positively impacts reputation.  
 
Table 4 
The impact of total risk reporting on reputation scores according to  idiosyncratic risk 
*+,-./01 	 
2  23401  2567.01  258+01  253.4.01  289:01  ;01 
Table 4 presents the results of the random effects model of the equation (1) for high-low risk firms. 
Scores is the Fortune magazine’s reputation scores, published with its list of “France’s Most Admired 
Companies”, RD is the total number of risks words, Lage is the log of the number of years since creation, Lmc 
is log of annual market capitalization, LReDe is log of annual research and development expenditures, and mtb 
is the annual average of daily market to book ratio. Wooldridge test is used to test the serial autocorrelation for 
panel data. 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
Variable Very high-risk firms low-risk firms 
Scores Coef P-value Coef P-value 
RD .0000374 0.697 .0000739** 0.020 
Lage -.3163713** 0.028 -.3341193*** 0.010 
Lmc .2829109** 0.028 .3726672*** 0.002 
LReDe -.261189* 0.064 -.2520267** 0.049 
mtb -.0211148 0.233 -.0260033 0.138 
Constant 7.818128*** 0.000 6.5346*** 0.000 
Wooldridge 
test 0.111 0.132 
R-square 0.22 0.40 
6. Robustness Test 
We have shown that our findings are robust with regard to pooled OLS and random effects 
models. In this section, we aim to test the robustness of our results with respect to alternative 
measurements of the reputation variable. We use a dummy variable of reputation that equals 1 
for those firms with a score in Fortune Magazine’s reputation scores, published with its list of 
“France’s Most Admired Companies”, and 0 for those without a score. We estimate the 
equation 2:
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  (2) Where RepD is the reputation dummy variable with a value of 1 for those firms with a 
score in Fortune Magazine’s reputation scores, and 0 otherwise, RD is the log total number of 
risk words, Lage is the log of the number of years since creation, Lmc is the log of annual 
market capitalization, LReDe is the log of annual research and development expenditure, and 
mtb is the annual average of the daily market to book ratio. 
 
 
Table 5 
The impact of total risk reporting on the reputation dummy variable 
 
Table 5 presents the results of pooled logistic, conditional fixed effect logistic and random effects logistic regressions of 
the equation (2): 
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Where RepD is the reputation dummy variable with a value of 1 for those firms with a score in Fortune Magazine’s 
reputation scores, and 0 otherwise, RD is the total number of risk words, Lage is the log of the number of years since 
creation, Lmc is the log of annual market capitalization, LReDe is the log of annual research and development 
expenditure, and mtb is the annual average of the daily market to book ratio. The Lagrange multiplier test is used to test 
the random effects model versus the pooling regression. The Hausman specification test is used to test the fixed effects 
model versus the random effects model. The variance inflation factor is tabulated to test the autocorrelation for pooling 
regression. The Wooldridge test is used to test the serial autocorrelation for panel data. 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
Variable Pooled logistic Fixed effects logistic Random effects logistic 
RepD Coef P.value Coef P.value Coef P.value 
RD .00010* 0.066 .00083* 0.089 .00032* 0.088 
Lage .24039 0.146 -9.29462 0.476 .79830 0.270 
Lmc .34341** 0.039 -.54249 0.774 1.03564 0.147 
LReDe .73722* 0.071 -2.50329 0.315 1.20648 0.114 
mtb .26607*** 0.000 1.14770 0.215 .77652* 0.095 
Constant -15.26049*** 0.000   -34.44942*** 0.004 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable. We use three logistic regressions to estimate this 
equation (pooled logistic, conditional fixed effects logistic and random effects logistic 
regressions). The results are presented in table 5.  We find that risk reporting positively 
impacts company reputation for our three empirical models at a 10% level of significance. 
The negative impact of control variables no longer exists. The pooled logistic model suggests 
a positive and significant impact of firm value, research and development expenditure, and 
market to book ratio on the firm’s reputation. The fixed effects logistic model displays 
insignificant impact of all control variables on reputation. However, the random effects 
logistic model suggests that market to book ratio has a significant and positive effect. In a 
nutshell, the findings confirm the robustness of the positive impact of risk disclosure on firm 
reputation. But they do not confirm the negative effect of the controls on reputation. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the impact of risk reporting on company reputation. Multiple 
empirical models were used to explore this relationship (pooled OLS, fixed effects, random 
effect, and pooled logistic, conditional fixed effects logistic and random effects logistic 
models). We argue that risk reporting significantly and positively impacts company 
reputation. In addition, our findings indicate that this positive impact still exists for low-risk 
firms. However, risk disclosure does not have a significant effect on the firm’s reputation for 
very high-risk firms. We found that our results are robust for alternative measurements of the 
reputation variable and for several regression models. This study has implications for theory 
and practice. First, we confirm that the impact of risk disclosure on reputation does not differ 
from the impact of total firm disclosure (voluntary and mandatory). Second, our study 
motivates the firms to disclose more risk information to promote their reputation. One 
limitation of this study concerns the reputation variable. Since Fortune Magazine is not 
specialized in the French market, only 33 French firms are listed in the magazine per year, 
which impacted the number of observations used in this study. 
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